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US-China trade war imperils Amazon rainforests 1 
 2 
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 4 
During 2018, the United States introduced tariffs on goods from China worth US$250 billion, 5 
initiating a ‘trade war’ between the two countries. In retaliation, the Chinese imposed tariffs of 25% 6 
on US goods worth US$110 billion, including almost all of the soybean exports from the United 7 
States to China. As a direct result, soybean exports dropped in November 2018 by 96% from their 8 
level of one year previously1,2.  9 
Trade wars have global consequences, since soybean production in other countries will now supply 10 
the shortfall in China’s imports. Brazil already supplies 66% of Chinese soy imports and has the 11 
infrastructure and potential land area to rapidly increase production. Few other countries are in this 12 
position. Historically, increases in global soybean demand have caused agricultural expansion 13 
within the Brazilian Amazon, consequently leading to large-scale deforestation. Hence, the current 14 
US-China trade war puts tropical forests directly in the firing line.  15 
 16 
China is heavily dependent on soybean imports from a small number of trading partners. Brazil is the 17 
largest supplier, followed by the US and Argentina. Ninety further countries, including China itself, 18 
produce little more than Argentina all together, and only a small number maintain a soybean trading 19 
relationship with China (Table 1). For China to make up the shortfall in US soy exports domestically, it 20 
would have to triple its soybean production (to cover an area of approximately 13Mha) to the 21 
detriment of other food producing land uses.  22 
 23 
Some smaller producers have signalled their intention to increase soybean production: Russia, for 24 
instance, plans a 20% increase to produce 0.7Mt3. However, even these production increases are tiny 25 
compared with the total shortfall. More significantly, Argentina and the EU have recently been buying 26 
cheap soybean from the US to be used for domestic livestock feed1,4, potentially freeing domestic 27 
soybean (Argentina) or rapeseed (EU) production for export to China (if China allows this indirect 28 
circumvention of their tariffs). The Chinese Government has also proposed to reduce the soybean 29 
component of livestock fodder, but soy is so dominant that even a 2% reduction would lead to a 10Mt 30 
drop in meat production3. Chinese soy reserves could replace some imports in the short-term, but the 31 
size of these reserves, while unknown, is probably only between 6 and 8Mt3.  32 
  33 
Brazil, in contrast, is poised to increase soy production very rapidly. Recent constraints, in the form of 34 
political, legal and trade-system interventions that prevented soy expansion into the Amazon5,6, are 35 
now being weakened6–9, with the result that deforestation increased by 29% between 2015 and 2016 36 
and a further 50% during the recent Brazilian presidential election campaign10,11. Large increases in 37 
soy production are likely to lead to considerable further forest loss through both direct expansion into 38 
the Amazon and indirect displacement of livestock farming. Indeed, a clear precedent exists in the 39 
form of the 1980 US embargo on soybean exports to the Soviet Union, which resulted in Brazil 40 
massively increasing soy production to replace the US exports12,13. Soy cultivation in Brazil grew from 41 
9.7Mha in 1990 to 24.2Mha in 2010, causing nearly a quarter of the total Amazon deforestation in 42 
some years and additionally pushing cattle farming from the southern Cerrado savanna into the 43 
Amazon14,9. Even though the embargo was withdrawn only one year later, the Soviet Union did not 44 
resume imports from the US, having come to regard them as unnecessary and unreliable12,13.  45 
 46 
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Will such a scenario happen again? In the present case, there are a number of ways in which US exports 47 
to China could be replaced. In principle, the entire shortfall could be met by increased production in 48 
Brazil, although it is more likely that a few major producers will share the extra production. In either 49 
case, the level of remaining trade between the US and China (currently 4% of its initial value1) would 50 
determine the magnitude of consequent land use changes, as would the level of demand in China and 51 
globally. The geographical extent of these changes further depends upon the soy yields that are 52 
achievable under different price and trade conditions (Figure 1, Table 1). 53 
 54 
In spite of these uncertainties, it is possible to calculate a potential range of the increase in Brazilian 55 
soybean production. Assuming no change in total global demand, an extra 22.6-37.6Mt of Brazilian 56 
soybean production would satisfy China’s demand (Figure1/Table1). Under current Brazilian soybean 57 
yields, this would require an additional area of 7.8 - 13.0Mha, an increase of 23.5% to 39.1%. At most, 58 
this is just over 4-years’ worth of the 3Mha/yr of deforestation seen in the peak deforestation years 59 
of 1995 and 200410). Alternatively, a proportional sharing of production between countries would 60 
reduce the extra Brazilian contribution to 10.0-16.7Mt, giving an additional area requirement of 3.4-61 
5.7Mha (an increase of 10.4% to 17.3%) (Figure1/Table1). Argentina would then supply an additional 62 
6.1-10.2Mt (2.0-3.3Mha at current yields), with other producers, excluding China, producing 63 
somewhat less than this amount (Figure1/Table1). While these figures are large, they do not account 64 
for increases in demand unrelated to tariffs that would increase production further. They also do not 65 
account for the potential substitution of soybean by other protein and oil crops elsewhere in the 66 
world, which would have the effect of limiting the soybean production increases. Chinese soybean 67 
demand has increased exponentially in recent years, with imports increasing since 2000 by 200% from 68 
Argentina, 700% from the US and 2,000% from Brazil. It is almost inevitable that further rapid rises 69 
will occur, largely driven by demand for livestock feed and bioenergy. This implies that increases in 70 
demand might well outstrip the potential effects of substitution meaning that the production changes 71 
presented here are relatively conservative. 72 
 73 
The impacts of these rises could be ameliorated by yield increases (through intensification), but the 74 
potential for this is not great. The top soybean producers in the world currently achieve yields of 1.5-75 
3t/ha (Brazil: 2.9t/ha; Argentina: 3.0t/ha; Canada: 2.7t/ha; Russian Federation: 1.5t/ha), compared to 76 
the United States’ 3.5t/ha. This suggests some potential for intensification rather than area expansion, 77 
but simple intensification options such as increasing nutrient supplies through fertilizers (e.g. synthetic 78 
nitrogen, potassium and phosphorus fertilizers) have already been widely deployed. While the US 79 
currently applies fertilisers to soybean at an average rate of 62kg/ha, Canada uses 60kg/ha and Brazil 80 
169kg/ha, on nutrient-poor tropical soils. Only Russia (26kg/ha) and Argentina (14kg/ha) have clear 81 
potential for intensification. If yield increases continued at historical rates, Brazil would need around 82 
10 years to achieve even the lowest estimate of extra production presented above without area 83 
expansion (Table 1). The substitution of other crops could also reduce the need for extra production, 84 
but technical and political issues limited this option. In Brazil’s case, soybean, sugarcane and maize 85 
represent ca. 85% of total crop production, with sugarcane providing independence from the global 86 
oil market, and maize used for livestock fodder. Substitution with palm oil from Malaysia or Indonesia 87 
is possible, but this would also cause tropical deforestation in those countries15–17. 88 
 89 
Should tariffs remain in place, therefore, even the most optimistic scenarios imply massive additional 90 
tropical deforestation in Brazil as well as West Africa and South-East Asia. This will have profound 91 
impacts on global attempts to mitigate climate change and to protect biological diversity. For instance, 92 
Brazil’s contribution to the Paris Agreement promises forest-based mitigation amounting to half of 93 
the global total, making it essential to efforts to limit average global temperature increases to 1.5⁰C18. 94 
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However, even current rates of tropical deforestation are projected to release between 87 and 130Gt 95 
of carbon by 2100, and land use change is expected to increase more in the tropics than in any other 96 
biome this century18,19 20,21. Similarly, species extinctions in tropical forests are already projected to 97 
increase until the mid-21st century, with as many as 19 of every 20 species lost being unknown to 98 
science22,23. Where soy expansion occurs in other areas (e.g. Brazil’s Cerrado tropical savannah, an 99 
invaluable ecosystem in its own right), displacement effects will lead to further tropical forest loss14.  100 
 101 
Whatever the outcome of the current ‘trade-war’, it has become clear that tropical forests, some of 102 
the most important ecosystems in the world, remain highly vulnerable to disruptions in international 103 
trade. The lack of tangible financial benefits arising from these large forests has consistently put them 104 
at a disadvantage compared with smaller, more intensively-utilised areas, the conversion of which 105 
would have numerous complex implications for human activities. The status of tropical forests as 106 
expansion zones for agriculture has been confirmed repeatedly, with legal interventions proving too 107 
weak or temporary to protect them. Even if the trade war comes to an end, the damage to tropical 108 
forests will already have been done, since they cannot be reinstated.    109 
 110 
The US-China trade war highlights the need for better protection of tropical forests to conserve their 111 
unique contributions to the global climate system, biodiversity and human wellbeing. Protection 112 
needs to be robust to the inevitable political and economic ‘shocks’ that have caused so much 113 
deforestation in the past, and to neutralise the corrosive effects of international agricultural trade that 114 
does not account for environmental damage. Without protection, the increasing scale and volatility 115 
of international agricultural trade, combined with the massive increase in the consumption of livestock 116 
products, will single-handedly undermine attempts to locate a safe operating space for humanity. 117 
 118 
 119 
 120 
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Figure 1: Soybean area of top producers for domestic production and export. The two bars for each region refer to different 121 
cases: ‘worst-case’ (left) and ‘shared responsibility’ (right). The yellow shadings refer to 60% (dark) to 100% (bright) shortfall 122 
from the US that is supplied by the country. Conversely, the grey shadings refer to the remaining 10% (bright) to 40% (dark) 123 
export from the US to China under the tariffs. Exports from the US to China recently dropped by 96%, and therefore all results 124 
assume a substantial increase in exports from their current levels. 125 
 126 
Table 1: Soybean production and area of top producers, based on FAO data in 2016. Additional production and area 127 
requirements refer to ‘shared responsibility’ amongst soybean producers, with ‘*’ indicating where Brazil alone makes up 128 
the shortfall  129 
 Argentina Brazil Canada 
Russian 
Federation 
United 
States of 
America 
Uruguay 
Rest of 
the 
World 
China 
Area         
Soybean for export to China (Mha) 2.6 13.7 0.7 0.3 10.8 0.2 >0.1 0 
Soybean total (Mha) 19.5 33.1 2.2 2.1 33.5 1.1 23.3 6.6 
Minimum additional area required, 
assuming 60% loss of US export 
(Mha) 
2.0 
3.4 
(*7.8) 
0.2 0.2 n/a 0.1 2.4 0.7 
Maximum additional area required, 
assuming 100% loss of US export 
(Mha) 
3.3 
5.7 
(*13.0) 
0.4 0.4 n/a 0.2 4.0 1.1 
Production         
Soybean for export to China (Mt) 7.8 39.7 1.9 0.5 37.6 0.4 0.2 0 
Soybean total (Mt) 58.8 96.3 5.8 3.1 117.2 2.2 39.4 12.0 
Minimum additional production 
required, assuming 60% loss of US 
export (Mt) 
6.1 
10.0 
(*22.6) 
0.6 0.3 0 0.2 4.0 1.2 
Maximum additional production 
required, assuming 100% loss of US 
export (Mt) 
10.2 
16.7 
(*37.6) 
1.0 0.5 0 0.4 6.8 2.1 
Relative         
Minimum increase (%) 10.4 
10.4 
(*23.5) 
10.4 10.4 0 10.4 10.4 10.4 
Maximum increase (%) 17.3 
17.3 
(*39.1) 
17.3 17.3 0 17.3 17.3 17.3 
 130 
 131 
 132 
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METHODS 197 
1. Data 198 
1.1. Data on soybean harvest, yield, production and trade 199 
Harvested area, yield, production and trade data from the various countries were obtained from 200 
FAOSTAT database hosted by FAO24. In our analysis, we used the latest available year, 2016. For the 201 
trade analysis we used the trade matrix of the FAO considering the following soy products: ‘soybeans’, 202 
‘oil, soybean’, ‘cake, soybean’, ‘soya sauce’, ‘soya paste’.  203 
 204 
1.2. Data on fertilizer use for soybean 205 
We used fertilizer data (N+P+K) for soybeans from the report ‘Assessment of Fertilizer Use by Crop at 206 
the Global Level’ published by the International Fertilizer Association (IFA) an International Plant 207 
Nutrition Institute (IPNI)25. This report contains fertilizer data of the year 2014 for the US, Brazil, 208 
Canada, Russia and Argentina. 209 
 210 
2. Calculation of additional soybean demand due to shortfall of US exports to China 211 
We deducted the ‘US soy exports to China’ from the ‘total soybean imports to China’. For the ‘worst 212 
case’ scenario, we redistributed the US shortfall in exports to the Brazilian production. For the ‘shared 213 
responsibility’ case, we redistributed the US shortfall amongst all soybean producers, including China. 214 
In this case, the fractional additional demand for the producers was calculated on basis of the share 215 
in global total soybean production. Production demands were converted into area demands using the 216 
estimated additional demand of production each country divided by the current yield of this country. 217 
 218 
3. Calculation of annual yield increases of Brazil 219 
Data availability: The datasets generated during and/or analysed during the current study are publicly 220 
available as referenced within this published article. The files are available from the corresponding 221 
author on reasonable request 222 
References (Methods) 223 
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